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Abstract. Designers of distributed database systems face the choice between stronger consistency guaran-
tees and better performance. A number of applications only require read atomicity (RA) (either all or none
of a transaction’s updates are visible to other transactions) and prevention of lost updates (PLU). Existing
distributed transaction systems that meet these requirements also provide additional stronger consistency
guarantees (such as causal consistency), but this comes at the price of lower performance. In this paper we
propose a new distributed transaction protocol, ROLA, that targets application scenarios where only RA
and PLU are needed. We formally specify ROLA in Maude. We then perform model checking to analyze both
the correctness and the performance of ROLA. For correctness, we use standard model checking to analyze
ROLA’s satisfaction of RA and PLU. To analyze performance we: (a) perform statistical model checking to
analyze key performance properties; and (b) compare these performance results with those obtained by also
modeling and analyzing in Maude the well-known protocols Walter and Jessy that also guarantee RA and
PLU. Our statistical model checking results show that ROLA outperforms both Walter and Jessy.
Keywords: Distributed Database Systems; Transaction Protocols; Consistency Models; Performance Eval-
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1. Introduction
Distributed transaction protocols are complex distributed systems whose design is quite challenging because:
(i) as for other distributed systems, validating correctness is very hard to achieve by testing alone; (ii) the
high performance requirements needed in many applications are hard to measure before implementation, and
expensive to compare across different implementations; and (iii) there is an unavoidable tension between
the degree of consistency needed for the intended applications and the high performance required of the
transaction protocol for such applications: balancing well these two requirements is essential.
In this work, we present our results on how to use formal modeling and analysis as early as possible
in the design process to arrive at a mature design of a new distributed transaction protocol, called ROLA,
meeting specific correctness and performance requirements before such a protocol is implemented. In this
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way, the above-mentioned design challenges (i)–(iii) can be adequately met. We also show how using this
formal design approach it is relatively easy to compare ROLA with other existing transaction protocols.
This is also part of meeting design challenge (iii), since the key comparisons focus on how well each protocol
balances the consistency vs. performance trade-offs for the intended applications.
ROLA in a Nutshell. Different applications require negotiating the consistency vs. performance trade-
offs in different ways. The key issue is the application’s required degree of consistency, and how to meet
such requirements with high performance. Cerone et al. [11] survey a hierarchy of consistency models for
distributed transaction protocols including, in increasing order of strength:
• Read atomicity (RA): Either all or none of a distributed transaction’s updates are visible to another
transaction (that is, there are no “fractured reads”).
• Causal consistency (CC): If transaction T2 is causally dependent on transaction T1, then if another
transaction sees the updates by T2, it must also see the updates of T1 (e.g., if A posts something on a
social media, and C sees B’s comment on A’s post, then C must also see A’s original post).
• Parallel snapshot isolation (PSI): Strengthens CC by also preventing lost updates. PSI allows different
commit orders at different sites, while still guaranteeing that a transaction reads the most recent version
committed at the transaction execution site, as of the time when the transaction begins. For example, A
sees C’s post before seeing D’s post, whereas B sees D’s post before C’s post, assuming the two posts
are independent of each other. In other words, C and D can commit their posts without waiting for each
other.
• And so on, all the way up to the well-known serializability guarantees.
A key property of transaction protocols is the prevention of lost updates (PLU). The weakest consistency
model in [11] satisfying both RA and PLU is PSI. However, PSI, and the well-known protocol Walter [34]
implementing PSI, also guarantee CC. Furthermore, in [6], Ardekani et al. propose a consistency model
called non-monotonic snapshot isolation (NMSI)—and a distributed transaction protocol called Jessy that
implements NMSI—that is weaker than PSI, but still satisfies RA, CC, and PLU. To the best of our knowl-
edge, up to now NMSI has in fact been the weakest consistency model satisfying both RA and PLU, which
means that all current such models also satisfy CC. However, Cerone et al. conjecture in [11] that a system
guaranteeing RA and PLU without guaranteeing CC should be useful:
“existing consistency models do not include a counterpart of Read Atomic obtained by adding the NoCon-
flict axiom [preventing lost updates]. Such an ‘Update Atomic’ consistency model would prevent lost update
anomalies without having to enforce causal consistency [...]. Update Atomic could be particularly useful [...].”
There was until now no database design supporting such “update atomicity”1 without also providing CC.
Filling this gap; that is, presenting a design, ROLA, that does exactly this for multi-partition transactions,
is what we do in this paper.
The main idea of the ROLA algorithm is to extend the RAMP algorithm of Bailis et al. [7], that ensures
read atomicity for partitioned data stores (i.e., data are partitioned across widely distributed data centers,
but are not replicated) where a transaction can read and/or write data stored at different partitions, by
adding mechanisms for preventing lost updates. Therefore, unlike Jessy and Walter, which support partially
replicated data stores, ROLA, like RAMP, at the moment only targets partitioned data stores.
Two key questions about ROLA’s design are:
(a) Are there natural applications needing high performance where RA plus PLU provide a sufficient degree
of consistency?
(b) Can the new ROLA design meeting RA plus PLU outperform existing designs, like Walter and Jessy,
that also guarantee RA and PLU?
Regarding question (a), an example of a transaction that requires RA and PLU but not CC is the “becoming
friends” transaction on social media. Bailis et al. [7] point out that RA is crucial for this operation: If Edinson
and Neymar become friends, then Thomas should not see a fractured read where Edinson is a friend of
Neymar, but Neymar is not a friend of Edinson. An implementation of “becoming friends” must obviously
1 In the above hierarchy of consistency models, ROLA’s “update atomic” is strictly stronger than RA, incomparable with CC,
and strictly weaker than NMSI.
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guarantee PLU: the new friendship between Edinson and Neymar must not be lost. Finally, CC could be
sacrificed for the sake of performance: Assume that Dani is a friend of Neymar. When Edinson becomes
Neymar’s friend, he sees that Dani is Neymar’s friend, and therefore also becomes friend with Dani. The
second friendship therefore causally depends on the first one. However, it does not seem crucial that others
are aware of this causality: If Thomas sees that Edinson and Dani are friends, then it is not necessary that
he knows that (this happened because) Edinson and Neymar are friends.
Regarding question (b), Section 7 shows that ROLA clearly outperforms both Walter and Jessy in all
performance requirements for all read/write transaction rates. For a fair comparison, we have compared the
performance of ROLA with those of Jessy and Walter without their replication features.
Maude-Based Formal Modeling and Analysis. In rewriting logic [26], distributed systems are specified
as rewrite theories. Maude [12] is a high-performance language implementing rewriting logic and supporting
various model checking analyses. To model time and performance issues, ROLA is specified in Maude as a
probabilisitic rewrite theory [4, 12]. ROLA’s RA and PLU requirements are then analyzed by standard model
checking, where we disregard time issues. To estimate ROLA’s performance, and to compare it with those
of Jessy and Walter, we have also specified Walter and Jessy—without their data replication features—in
Maude, and have subjected the Maude models of ROLA, Walter, and Jessy to statistical model checking
analysis using the PVeStA [5] tool.
Main Contributions include: (1) the design, formal modeling, and model checking analysis of ROLA,
a new transaction protocol having useful applications and meeting RA and PLU consistency properties
with competitive performance; (2) a detailed performance comparison by statistical model checking between
ROLA and the Walter and Jessy protocols showing that ROLA outperforms both Walter and Jessy in all
such comparisons, including higher throughput and lower average latency; (3) to the best of our knowledge
the first demonstration that, by a suitable use of formal methods, a completely new distributed transaction
protocol can be designed and thoroughly analyzed, as well as be compared with other designs, very early on,
before its implementation.
This paper is an extension our conference paper [23]. In addition to giving more details in general, the
new contributions can be summarized as follows:
• First and foremost, in contrast to [23], where we only showed 2 of 15 rewrite rules specifying ROLA, we
now give a much more thorough formal specification of ROLA by showing 13 rewrite rules and providing
the definition of many key functions in our formal specification.
• In [23] we only compared ROLA to the Walter protocol guaranteeing PSI. However, since Jessy only
guarantees the weaker NMSI property (that still guarantees RA and PLU), Jessy should outperform
Walter. Therefore, a performance comparison with Jessy is necessary and is provided in this paper.
• We provide an informal correctness argument for ROLA.
• In [23] we show how to formalize and model check in Maude the RA property; in this paper we also show
how PLU and CC can be formalized and analyzed using Maude.
• This paper also analyzes the transaction commit rate for ROLA, Jessy, and Walter.
• This paper shows how to generate initial states probabilistically.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives preliminaries on the RAMP transaction
protocol, which ROLA extends, rewriting logic and Maude, and statistical model checking of probabilistic
rewrite theories using PVeStA. Section 3 gives an informal overview of the ROLA transaction protocol, and
Section 4 gives an informal correctness argument that ROLA satisfies RA and PLU. Section 5 presents our
formal specification of ROLA. Section 6 explains how the RA, PLU, and CC properties can be formalized
in Maude, and how we can use Maude reachability analysis to automatically check whether ROLA satisfies
these properties for given initial system states. Section 7 explains how we can use our formal model and the
PVeStA statistical model to estimate the performance of ROLA, as well as of Jessy and Walter, in terms of
average transaction latency, transaction commit rate, and transaction throughput, and shows the results of
estimating the performance of both ROLA, Walter, and Jessy. Finally, Section 8 discusses related work, and
Section 9 gives some concluding remarks.
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2. Preliminaries
2.1. Rewriting Logic and Maude
A membership equational logic (Mel) [27] signature is a triple Σ = (K,Σ, S) with K a set of kinds, Σ =
{Σw,k}(w,k)∈K∗×K a many-kinded signature, and S = {Sk}k∈K a K-kinded family of disjoint sets of sorts.
The kind of a sort s is denoted by [s]. A Σ-algebra A consists of a set Ak for each kind k, a function
Af : Ak1 × · · · × Akn → Ak for each operator f ∈ Σk1···kn,k, and a subset inclusion As ⊆ Ak for each sort
s ∈ Sk. The set TΣ,k denotes the set of ground Σ-terms with kind k, and TΣ(X)k denotes the set of Σ-terms
with kind k over the set X of kinded variables.
A Mel theory is a pair (Σ, E) with Σ a Mel-signature and E a finite set of Mel sentences, which are
either conditional equations or conditional memberships of the forms:
(∀X) t = t′ if
∧
i
pi = qi ∧
∧
j
wj : sj , (∀X) t : s if
∧
i
pi = qi ∧
∧
j
wj : sj ,
where t, t′ ∈ TΣ(X)k and s ∈ Sk for some kind k ∈ Σ, the latter stating that t is a term of sort s, provided the
condition holds. In Maude, an individual equation in the condition may also be a matching equation pl := ql,
which is mathematically interpreted as an ordinary equation. However, operationally, the new variables
occurring in the term pl become instantiated by matching the term pl against the canonical form of the
instance of ql (see [12] for further explanations). Order-sorted notation s1 < s2 abbreviates the conditional
membership (∀x : [s1]) x : s2 if x : s1. Similarly, an operator declaration f : s1 × · · · × sn → s corresponds
to declaring f at the kind level and giving the membership axiom (∀ x1 : [s1], . . . , xn : [sn]) f(x1, . . . , xn) :
s if
∧
1≤i≤n xi : si.
A Maude module specifies a rewrite theory [26] of the form (Σ, E ∪ A,R), where: (i) (Σ, E ∪ A) is a
membership equational logic theory specifying the system’s state space as an algebraic data type with A
a set of equational axioms (such as a combination of associativity, commutativity, and identity axioms), to
perform equational deduction with the equations E (oriented from left to right) modulo the axioms A, and
(ii) R is a set of labeled conditional rewrite rules specifying the system’s local transitions, each of which has
the form:
l : q −→ r if
∧
i
pi = qi ∧
∧
j




where l is a label, and q, r are Σ-terms of the same kind. Intuitively, such a rule specifies a one-step transition
from a substitution instance of q to the corresponding substitution instance of r, provided the condition
holds; that is, that the substitution instance of each condition in the rule follows from R.
We briefly summarize the syntax of Maude and refer to [12] for more details. Sorts and subsort rela-
tions are declared by the keywords sort and subsort, and operators are introduced with the op keyword:
op f : s1 . . . sn -> s, where s1 . . . sn are the sorts of its arguments, and s is its (value) sort. Operators can
have user-definable syntax, with underbars ‘_’ marking each of the argument positions, and are declared
with the sorts of their arguments and the sort of their result. Some operators can have equational attributes,
such as assoc, comm, and id, stating, for example, that the operator is associative and commutative and has
a certain identity element. Such attributes are then used by the Maude engine to match terms modulo the
declared axioms. An operator can also be declared to be a constructor (ctor) that defines the data elements
of a sort.
There are three kinds of logical statements in the Maude language, equations, memberships (declaring
that a term has a certain sort), and rewrite rules, introduced with the following syntax:
• equations: eq u = v or ceq u = v if condition;
• memberships: mb u : s or cmb u : s if condition;
• rewrite rules: rl [l]: u => v or crl [l]: u => v if condition.
An equation f(t1, . . . , tn) = t with the owise (for “otherwise”) attribute can be applied to a term f(. . .)
only if no other equation with left-hand side f(u1, . . . , un) can be applied.The mathematical variables in
such statements are either explicitly declared with the keywords var and vars, or can be introduced on the
fly in a statement without being declared previously, in which case they have the form var:sort. Finally, a
comment is preceded by ‘***’ or ‘---’ and lasts till the end of the line.
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In object-oriented Maude specifications, a class declaration class C | att1 : s1, ..., attn : sn
declares a class C of objects with attributes att1 to attn of sorts s1 to sn. An object instance of class C is
represented as a term < O : C | att1 : val1, . . . , attn : valn >, where O, of sort Oid, is the object’s identifier,
and where val1 to valn are the current values of the attributes att1 to attn. A message is a term of sort
Msg. A system state is modeled as a term of the sort Config, and has the structure of a multiset made up
of objects and messages.
The dynamic behavior of a system is axiomatized by specifying each of its transition patterns by a rewrite
rule. For example, the rule (with label l)
rl [l] : m(O,w)
< O : C | a1: x, a2: O’, a3: z >
=>
< O : C | a1: x + w, a2: O’, a3: z >
m’(O’,x) .
defines a family of transitions in which a message m, with parameters O and w, is read and consumed by an
object O of class C, the attribute a1 of the object O is changed to x + w, and a new message m’(O’,x) is
generated. Attributes whose values do not change and do not affect the next state, such as a3 and a2, need
not be mentioned in a rule; all such “superfluous” attributes can be replaced by a variable (such as AS) of
sort AttributeSet, so that the above can also be written
rl [l] : m(O,w) < O : C | a1: x, AS > => < O : C | a1: x + w, AS > m’(O’,x) .
Reachability Analysis in Maude. Maude provides a number of high-performance analysis methods,
including rewriting for simulation purposes, reachability analysis, and linear temporal logic (LTL) model
checking. In this paper, we use reachability analysis to model check consistency properties. Given an initial
state init, a state pattern pattern and an (optional) condition cond, Maude’s search command searches the
reachable state space from init in a breadth-first manner for states that match pattern such that cond holds:
search [bound] init =>! pattern such that cond .
where bound provides an upper bound in the number of solutions to be found (if omitted, there is no such
upper bound). The arrow =>! means that Maude only searches for reachable final states (i.e., states that
cannot be further rewritten) that match pattern and satisfies cond. If the arrow used is instead =>* then
Maude searches for all reachable states matching the search pattern and satisfying cond.
2.2. Statistical Model Checking and PVeStA
Distributed systems are probabilistic in nature, e.g., network latency such as message delay may follow a
certain probability distribution, plus some algorithms may be probabilistic. Systems of this kind can be
modeled by probabilistic rewrite theories [4] with rules of the form:
[l] : t(−→x )→ t′(−→x ,−→y ) if cond(−→x ) with probability −→y := pi(−→x )
where the term t′ has additional new variables −→y disjoint from the variables −→x in the term t. Since for a
given matching instance of the variables −→x there can be many (often infinite) ways to instantiate the extra
variables −→y , such a rule is non-deterministic. The probabilistic nature of the rule stems from the probability
distribution pi(−→x ), which depends on the matching instance of −→x , and governs the probabilistic choice of
the instance of −→y in the result t′(−→x ,−→y ) according to pi(−→x ). In this paper we use the above PMaude [4]
notation for probabilistic rewrite rules.
Statistical model checking [32, 36] is an attractive formal approach to analyzing probabilistic systems
against temporal logic properties. Instead of offering a binary yes/no answer, it provides a quantitative real-
valued answer and can verify a property up to a user-specified level of confidence by running Monte-Carlo
simulations of the system model. The quantitative answer, however, need not be a percentage or a probability:
it may instead be a latency estimation, or a quantitative estimation of some other performance property.
For example, a statistical model checking result may be “86.87% ROLA transactions commit successfully
with 95% confidence”. Existing statistical verification techniques assume that the system model is purely
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probabilistic. Using the methodology in [4, 13] we can eliminate non-determinism in the choice of firing
rules. We then use PVeStA [5], an extension and parallelization of the tool VeStA [33], to statistically
model check purely probabilistic systems against properties expressed by QuaTEx probabilistic temporal
logic [4]. The expected value of a QuaTEx expression is iteratively evaluated w.r.t. two parameters α and
δ provided as input by sampling until the size of (1-α)100% confidence interval is bounded by δ, where the
result of evaluating a formula is not a Boolean value, but a real number.
2.3. Read-Atomic Multi-Partition (RAMP) Transactions
To deal with ever-increasing amounts of data, large cloud systems partition their data across multiple data
centers. However, guaranteeing strong consistency properties for multi-partition transactions leads to high
latency. Therefore, trade-offs that combine efficiency with weaker transactional guarantees for such transac-
tions are needed.
In [7], Bailis et al. propose an isolation model, read atomic isolation, and Read Atomic Multi-Partition
(RAMP) transactions, that together provide efficient multi-partition operations that guarantee read atom-
icity (RA). For example, if A and B become “friends” in one transaction, then other transactions should not
see that A is a friend of B but that B is not a friend of A; either both relationships are visible or neither is.
RAMP transactions use metadata and multi-versioning. Metadata is attached to each write, and the reads
use this metadata to get the correct version. There are three versions of RAMP; in this paper we extend
and modify RAMP-Fast. To guarantee that all partitions perform a transaction successfully or that none
do, RAMP performs two-phase writes using the two-phase commit protocol (2PC). In the prepare phase,
each timestamped write is sent to its partition, which adds the write to its local database.2 In the commit
phase, each such partition updates an index which contains the highest-timestamped committed version of
each item stored at the partition.
RAMP assumes that there is no data replication: a data item is only stored at one partition. The
timestamps generated by a partition P are unique identifiers but are only sequentially increasing with
respect to P . A partition has access to methods get_all(I : set of items) and put_all(W : set of 〈item,
value〉 pairs).
put_all uses two-phase commit for each w in W . The first phase initiates a prepare operation on
the partition storing w.item, and the second phase completes the commit if each write partition agrees to
commit. In the first phase, the client (i.e., the partition executing the transaction) passes a version v : 〈item,
value, tsv,md〉 to the partition, where tsv is a timestamp generated for the transaction and md is metadata
containing all other items modified in the same transaction. Upon receiving this version v, the partition adds
it to a set of versions.
When a client initiates a get_all operation, then for each i ∈ I the client will first request the latest
version vector stored on the server for i. It will then look at the metadata in the version vector returned by
the server, iterating over each item in the metadata set. If it finds an item in the metadata that has a later
timestamp than the tsv in the returned vector, this means the value for i is out of date. The client can then
request the RA-consistent version of i.
The pseudo-code of RAMP-Fast in [7] is shown in Appendix A.
3. The ROLA Multi-Partition Transaction Algorithm
This section gives an informal overview of our proposed new algorithm, called ROLA, that guarantees both
RA and PLU, but not CC, for transactions accessing multiple partitions in a setting where the data are
partitioned (but not replicated) across a number of widely distributed sites.
ROLA extends RAMP-Fast to also ensure PLU. RAMP-Fast guarantees RA, but not PLU, since it
allows a write to overwrite conflicting writes: When a partition commits a write, it only compares the write’s
timestamp t1 with the local latest-committed timestamp t2, and updates the latest-committed timestamp
with t1 or t2. If the two timestamps are from two conflicting writes, then one of the writes is lost.
ROLA’s key idea to prevent lost updates is to sequentially order writes on the same key from a partition’s
2 RAMP does not consider write-write conflicts, so that writes are always prepared successfully (which is why RAMP does not
prevent lost updates).
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perspective by adding to each partition a map which maps each incoming version to an incremental sequence
number. For example, if the transactions T1 and T2 both read version x0 (with mapped sequence number
0) of the key x, and both try to write the respective versions x1 and x2. If T1 manages to write x1 first
(with mapped sequence number 1), then T2 is not allowed to overwrite x1, since the local sequence number
has increased by the time T2 tries to write x2. For write-only transactions the mapping can always be built;
for a read-write transaction the mapping can only be built if there has not been a mapping built since the
transaction fetched the value. This can be checked by comparing the last prepared version’s timestamp’s
mapping on the partition with the fetched version’s timestamp’s mapping. In this way, ROLA prevents lost
updates by allowing versions to be prepared only if no conflicting prepares occur concurrently.
Algorithm 1 ROLA
Server-side Data Structures
1: versions: list of versions 〈item, value, timestamp tsv, metadata md〉
2: latestCommit[i]: last committed timestamp for item i
3: seq[ts]: local sequence number mapped to timestamp ts
4: sqn: local sequence counter
Server-side Methods
get same as in RAMP-Fast (see Appendix A)
5: procedure prepare_update(v : version, tsprev : timestamp)
6: latest← last w ∈ versions : w.item = v.item
7: if latest = null or tsprev = latest.tsv then
8: sqn← sqn+ 1; seq[v.tsv]← sqn; versions.add(v)
9: return ack
10: else return latest
11: procedure prepare(v : version)
12: sqn ← sqn + 1; seq[v.tsv]← sqn; versions.add(v)
13: procedure commit(tsc : timestamp)
14: Its ← {w.item | w ∈ versions ∧ w.tsv = tsc}
15: for i ∈ Its do
16: if seq[tsc] > seq[latestCommit[i]] then latestCommit[i]← tsc
Coordinator-side Methods
put_all, get_all same as in RAMP-Fast (see Appendix A)
17: procedure update(I : set of items, OP : set of operations)
18: ret ← get_all(I); tstx ← generate new timestamp
19: parallel-for i ∈ I do
20: tsprev ← ret[i].tsv; v ← ret[i].value
21: w ← 〈item = i, value = opi(v), tsv = tstx,md = (I − {i})〉
22: p← prepare_update(w,tsprev)
23: if p = latest then
24: invoke application logic to, e.g., abort and/or retry the transaction
25: end parallel-for
26: parallel-for server s : s contains an item in I do
27: invoke commit(tstx) on s
28: end parallel-for
More specifically, ROLA adds two partition-side data structures: sqn, denoting the local sequence number
counter, and seq[ts], that maps a timestamp to a local sequence number. ROLA also changes the data
structure of versions in RAMP from a set to a list. ROLA then adds two methods to the existing RAMP-F
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functionality: the coordinator-side3 method update(I : set of items, OP : set of operations) and the partition-
side method prepare_update(v : version, tsprev : timestamp) for read-write transactions. Furthermore,
ROLA changes two partition-side methods in RAMP: prepare, besides adding the version to the local store,
maps its timestamp to the increased local sequence number; and commit marks versions as committed and
updates an index containing the highest-sequenced-timestamped committed version of each item. These two
partition-side methods apply to both write-only and read-write transactions. ROLA invokes RAMP-Fast’s
put_all, get_all and get methods to deal with read-only and write-only transactions.
ROLA starts a read-write transaction with the update procedure. It invokes RAMP-Fast’s get_all
method to retrieve the values of the items the client wants to update, as well as their corresponding times-
tamps. ROLA writes then proceed in two phases: a first round of communication places each timestamped
write on its respective partition. The timestamp of each version obtained previously from the get_all call
is also packaged in this prepare message. A second round of communication marks versions as committed.
At the partition-side, the partition begins the prepare_update routine by retrieving the last version in
its versions list with the same item as the received version. If such a version is not found, or if the version’s
timestamp tsv matches the passed-in timestamp tsprev, then the version is deemed prepared. The partition
keeps a record of this locally by incrementing a local sequence counter and mapping the received version’s
timestamp tsv to the current value of the sequence counter. Finally the partition returns an ack to the
client. If tsprev does not match the timestamp of the last version in versions with the same item, then this
latest timestamp is simply returned to the coordinator.
If the coordinator receives an ack from prepare_update, it immediately commits the version with the
generated timestamp tstx. If the returned value is instead a timestamp, the transaction is aborted.
Example 1. Assume that we have two data items, x and y, and two partitions, Px and Py, storing x and y,
respectively. As depicted in Figure 1, two read-write transactions T1 : r(y);w(x1);w(y1) and T2 : r(y);w(y2)
are attempting concurrent writes, and a read-only transaction T3 : r(x); r(y) proceeds while T1 is writing. T1
and T2 read the same version y0. Both T1 and T2 perform the two-phase commit protocol on two partitions,
Px and Py. However, T2 fails to prepare y2 after T1 has prepared y1, because when T2’s prepare arrives at
Py, the timestamp of the last version store on Py is 1, which is not equal to tsprev = 0 in T2’s prepare. T2,
upon receiving the returned version y1, could abort the transaction or retry with a new transaction on y1.
Either way the lost update problem is avoided. Regarding the case with T1 and T3, T3 reads from Px after
Px has committed T1’s write to x, but T3 reads from Py before Py has committed T1’s write to y. Thus,
T3’s first-round reads would violate RA if it returns them. Using the metadata attached to its first-round
reads, T3 determines to issue a second-round read to fetch the missing data from Py. After completing the
second-round read, T3 can safely return T1’s writes, not violating RA. Note that in this example RAMP
would allow T2 to commit, thus overwriting T1’s writes, which are then lost.
4. Correctness Argument for ROLA
In this section we give a somewhat informal correctness argument/proof sketch for ROLA. Since Section 5
defines a formal model of ROLA, we could—and should in the future—formally prove that ROLA satisfies
RA and PLU. However, such a full formal proof is beyond the scope of this paper.
4.1. Why ROLA Works
ROLA uses a two-phase commit protocol in order to detect concurrent writes. The first phase declares an
intent to commit a write at the partition. Concurrent writes race to the partition without coordinating with
each other. The partition can accept a preparation if there is no other prepared version after the latest
commit associated with the incoming preparation. This in effect imposes a total order on the preparations,
and thus on the commits, from the partition’s perspective. In other words, the partition sees no logically
concurrent updates. Our algorithm therefore provides read atomicity, and prevents updates from being lost,
as concurrent updates are a necessary condition for lost updates.
By leveraging the partition-side sequence counter to commit, ROLA not only prevents lost updates, but
3 The coordinator, or client, is the partition executing the transaction.
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Figure 1. ROLA execution with three transactions in Example 1. Due to the space limit, we assume that T1 and T2 have
fetched the same version y0 (i.e., tsprev = 0), when the sequence chart starts.
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also makes writes progress at the partition-side, and thus more recent prepared version can be reflected (we
refer to this as ROLA’s progress property). This is different from RAMP-Fast, where later prepared writes
may never be fetched by reads as latestCommit only updates by simply comparing the coordinator-side
timestamps.
4.2. Proof Sketch
We consider transactions to be ordered sequences of reads and writes to arbitrary sets of data items. Each
data item has a single logical copy. We call the set of data items a transaction reads and writes to its read
set and write set, respectively. Each write creates a version of a data item. We identify versions of items by
a timestamp from a totally ordered set (e.g., natural numbers) which is unique across all versions of each
item. Thus timestamps induce a total order on versions of each item. We denote version i of item x as xi.
Given two versions xi and xj , we write xi < xj if xj appears later than xi in the version order, and write
xi <next xj if xj is xi’s next version. Each item x has an initial version x0. Each transaction finishes with
being either committed or aborted. A history consists of a set of transactions, together with the versions the
transactions read and wrote.
Our correctness argument for ROLA, like that for RAMP in [7], is based on Adya’s formalization of
consistency models [3]. Following the formal reasoning about RAMP in [7], we also use Adya’s formalization
in the context of the above system model.
There may be three types of dependencies: read-dependency, write-dependency and anti-dependency
between two transactions.
Definition 4.1. (Read-Dependency). Transaction Tj directly read-depends on Ti if transaction Tj reads the
version xi that Ti has written.
Definition 4.2. (Write-Dependency). Transaction Tj directly write-depends on Ti if transaction Ti writes
a version xi and Tj writes xi’s next version xj .
Definition 4.3. (Anti-dependency). Transaction Tj directly anti-depends on Ti if transaction Ti reads some
version xh, and Tj writes xh’s next version xj .
Definition 4.4. (Direct Serialization Graph). A direct serialization graph (DSG) w.r.t. a historyH, denoted
by DSG(H), is defined as:
• each node is the graph corresponds to a committed transaction;
• each directed edge corresponds to a type of direct dependency: there is a read-/write-/anti-dependency
edge from Ti to Tj if Tj directly read-/write-/anti-depends on Ti.
In our model a transaction could also be a read-write transaction, in addition to read-only and write-only
transactions, which are the only ones considered in [7].
We can formalize various anomalies for distributed transactions in terms of DSGs. These anomalies are
then used to define consistency models.
Definition 4.5. (G0: Write Cycles). A history H exhibits phenomenon G0 if DSG(H) contains a directed
cycle consisting entirely of write-dependency edges.
Definition 4.6. (G1a: Aborted Reads). A history H exhibits phenomenon G1a if H contains an aborted
transaction Ta and a committed transaction Tc such that Tc reads a version written by Ta.
Definition 4.7. (G1b: Intermediate Reads). A history H exhibits phenomenon G1b if H contains a com-
mitted transaction Ti that reads a version xj written by Tj , and Tj also wrote a version xk such that
j < k.
Definition 4.8. (G1c: Circular Information Flow). A history H exhibits phenomenon G1c if DSG(H)
contains a directed cycle that consists entirely of read-dependency and write-dependency edges.
Besides the above criteria, we still need the definition of fractured reads to define RA.
Definition 4.9. (Fractured Reads). A transaction Tj exhibits the fractured reads phenomenon if some trans-
action Ti writes versions xa and xb (in any order, where x and y may or may not be distinct items), and
some transactions Tj reads versions xa and yc, and c < b.
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As defined in [7]: RA isolation prevents fractured reads, and transactions from reading uncommitted,
aborted, or intermediate versions:
Definition 4.10. (Read Atomicity). A system provides RA isolation if it prevents the phenomena G0, G1a,
G1b, G1c, and fractured reads.
Lost updates (LU) happen when two transactions simultaneously make conditional modifications to the
same data item(s).
Definition 4.11. (Lost Updates). A history H exhibits the phenomenon LU if DSG(H) contains a directed
cycle that consists of one or more anti-dependency edges and all edges are by the same data item.
To prove that ROLA provides RA, we must, according to Definition 4.10, prove that ROLA prevents the
phenomena G0, G1a, G1b, G1c, and fractured reads. The proof is in general quite similar to that of RAMP
providing RA (Appendix B in [7]), since ROLA reads are the same as RAMP reads, and ROLA writes are
more restricted, thus decreasing the possibility of violating RA.
Lemma 4.1. ROLA prevents the phenomenon G0.
Proof. Each partition has a local sequence number that increases once a version is prepared; the increased
sequence number is mapped to that version. Thus, versions (whether or not for the same item) on a partition
are totally ordered. That is, there is no directed cycle consisting entirely of write-dependency edges.
Lemma 4.2. ROLA prevents the phenomenon G1a.
Proof. ROLA first-round reads access lastCommit, so each version fetched by a first-round read is written by
a committed transaction. ROLA second-round reads only access the versions in the same transaction as for
the versions fetched by the first-round reads, which are also committed. Thus, ROLA never reads aborted
writes.
Lemma 4.3. ROLA prevents the phenomenon G1b.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.4. ROLA prevents the phenomenon G1c.
Proof. Writes (on possibly different data items) in a transaction are assigned the same timestamp, which
prevents read-dependency and write-dependency cycles.
To prove ROLA preventing fractured reads, we first introduce sibling versions, sibling item, companion
version, and companion sets.
Definition 4.12. (Sibling Versions). The set of versions produced by a transaction are called sibling ver-
sions.
Definition 4.13. (Sibling Item). Data item x is called a sibling item to a version yj if there exists a version
xk written in the same transaction as yj .
Definition 4.14. (Companion Version). Version xi is a companion version of yj if xi is a sibling version of
yj or if the transaction that wrote yj also wrote xk and i > k.
Definition 4.15. (Companion Sets). A set of versions V is a companion set if, for every pair (xi, yj) of
versions in V where x is a sibling item of yj , xi is a companion version of yj .
Lemma 4.5. (Atomicity of Companion Sets). In the absense of G1c phenomena, if the set of versions read
by a transaction is a companion set, the transaction does not exhibit fractured reads.
Proof. If V is a companion set, then every version xi in V is a companion version of every other version
yj in V that includes x in yj ’s sibling items. Suppose V has fractured reads. According to Definition 4.9,
there are two versions xi and xj such that the transaction that wrote yj also wrote a version xk with i < k.
However, in this case xi is not a companion version of yj according to Definition 4.14. Therefore we reach a
contradiction.
Lemma 4.6. ROLA reads assemble a companion set.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose a transaction reads two versions xi and yj , and x is yj ’s sibling
item. The following continues the proof by comparing i and j:
• Case 1. If i ≥ j, then xi is already a companion version of yj , and the set is therefore a companion set.
• Case 2. If i < j, then ROLA invokes RAMP-Fast’s get_all method to issue a second-round read to
fetch the companion version xj . Whether xj has been committed or not by the time the second-round
read reaches the partition, the ROLA partition invokes RAMP-Fast’s get method to return the prepared
version xj in versions.
Therefore, the resulting set of versions is a companion set.
Theorem 4.7. ROLA guarantees RA.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemmas 4.1–4.6.
To prove ROLA preventing LU, we must first prove some lemmas.
Lemma 4.8. Versions are ordered by the arrival order of the corresponding prepare messages.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.9. Given a historyH that is valid under ROLA, then each node in DSG(H) directly read-depends
on at most one other node with the same data item.
Proof. Suppose we have a transaction Ti in DSG(H) that directly read-depends on two different transactions
Tj and Tk with item x, namely Tj
r−→ Ti and Tk r−→ Ti. By Lemma 4.8, xj < xk or xk < xj . In either case Ti
exhibits fractured reads and H is not valid under RA (and thus ROLA), a contradiction.
Lemma 4.10. If a (read-write) transaction reads version xi, and then writes version xj , then xi <next xj .
Proof. Since xj has been prepared, it means that there was no prepared versions between xi and xj ; otherwise
the condition cannot be satisfied. Thus xi <next xj .
Lemma 4.11. Given a history H that is valid under ROLA. Each node in DSG(H) is then directly write-
dependent on at most one other node with the same data item.
Proof. Suppose we have a transaction Ti in DSG(H) that is directly write-dependent on two different trans-
actions Tj and Tk with item x, namely, Ti
w−→ Tj and Ti w−→ Tk.
• Case 1. Tj and Tk are both write-only transactions. Say Tj prepares first, and we have seq[xj ] < seq[xk]
because when prepared, the sequence number increases.
– Case 1.1. If Tj also commits first, Tj overwrites Ti and we have Ti
w−→ Tj . Currently, latestCommit[x] =
tsj . When Tk commits later, latestCommit[x] is mapped to tsk because seq[tsk] > seq[tsj ]. Then we
have Tj
w−→ Tk, a contradiction.
– Case 1.2. If Tk commits first, Tk overwrites Ti and we have Ti
w−→ Tk. Currently, latestCommit[x] =
tsk. When Tj commits later, latestCommit[x] is not updated because seq[tsj ] < seq[tsk]. Then we
only have Ti
w−→ Tk, a contradiction.
• Case 2. If Tj is a read-write transaction while Tk is a write-only transaction. According to Lemma 4.10,
Tj reads Ti. Thus Tk cannot prepare first because in that case Tj aborts. The proof then follows directly
from the above Case 1.1.
• Case 3. If Tj and Tk are both read-write transactions. According to Lemma 4.10, both Tj and Tk read
Ti. Either one prepares first, and the other one has to abort (the later prepare’s tsprev does not match
the latest version’s, i.e., the other prepare’s, timestamp).
Lemma 4.12. Given a history H that is valid under ROLA. Then DSG(H) does not contain a sequence
Th
anti−−−→ Ti anti−−−→ Tj .
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Proof. There is a transaction Ti′ whose version written xi′ is read by Ti, namely Ti′
r−→ Ti. Tj writes xi′ ’s
next version xj , namely Ti′
w−→ Tj . According to Lemma 4.10 and Lemma 4.11, we have Ti′ 6= Th. From
Th
anti−−−→ Ti we can build another two dependencies Th′ r−→ Th and Th′ w−→ Ti. We now have xi′ <next xi and
xh′ <next xi. According to Lemma 4.8 we must have xi′ = xh′ , and then we have Ti′
w−→ Ti. Since we already
have Ti′
w−→ Tj , we reach a contradiction (Lemma 4.11).
Lemma 4.13. Given a history H that is valid under ROLA. Then DSG(H) does not contain a sequence
Th
w−→ Ti anti−−−→ Tj .
Proof. There is a transaction Ti′ whose version written xi′ is read by Ti, namely Ti′
r−→ Ti. Tj writes xi′ ’s
next version xj , namely Ti′
w−→ Tj . According to Lemma 4.11, Th 6= Ti′ . Now we have xh <next xi and
xi′ <next xj . The following continues the proof by comparing the version order of xh and xi′ :
• Case 1. If xh < xi′ , we have xi < xi′ since xh’s next version is xi. According to Lemma 4.10, we have
xi′ <next xi. Therefore we reach a contradiction.
• Case 2. If xi′ < xh, because of xi′ <next xj , we have xi′ <next xj < xh <next xi. According to Lemma
4.10, we have xi′ <next xi. Therefore we reach a contradiction.
Theorem 4.14. ROLA prevents LU.
Proof. We prove this theorem by contradiction. Suppose there is a history H that is valid under ROLA, so
that DSG(H) contains a directed cycle having one or more anti-dependency edges and all edges are labeled
by the same data item x.
• Case 1. Suppose DSG(H) contain a directed cycle having only one anti-dependency edge Ta l1−→ ... l2−→
Th
lhi−−→ Ti lij−→ Tj l3−→ ... l4−→ Ta. Let lij be the anti-dependency edge. Thus, there is a transaction Ti′ whose
version written xi′ is read by Ti, namely Ti′
r−→ Ti; the transaction Tj writes xi′ ’s next version xj , namely
Ti′
w−→ Tj . According to Lemma 4.13 and Lemma 4.9, we have Ti′ = Th. Thus, we have another directed
cycle Ta
l1−→ ... l2−→ Th w−→ Tj l3−→ ... l4−→ Ta consisting entirely of read-dependency and write-dependency
edges (G1c), which contradicts Theorem 4.7.
• Case 2. Suppose DSG(H) contain a directed cycle having at least two anti-dependency edges. According to
Lemma 4.12, these anti-dependency edges are not consecutive. For each anti-dependency we directly follow
Case 1, and eventually we are able to construct a directed cycle consisting entirely of read-dependency
and write-dependency edges (G1c), which contradicts Theorem 4.7.
5. A Formal Executable Specification of ROLA
This section presents an executable formal specification of ROLA in rewriting logic. Besides providing an
unambiguous formal model of ROLA, this executable formal model can be used for both model checking
analysis of the RA and PLU properties, and for performance analysis by statistical model checking.
To introduce both time and probabilities for performance estimation, each message gets assigned a mes-
sage delay that is sampled probabilistically from a dense time interval according to a certain probability dis-
tribution. To analyze the correctness of ROLA, we just set all the message delays to zero, thereby obtaining
an untimed nondeterministic model, that can subjected to standard model checking, from our probabilistic
timed model. The whole specification is given at https://sites.google.com/site/siliunobi/fac-rola.
5.1. Probabilistic Sampling
Nodes send messages of the form [∆,rcvr <- msg], where ∆ is the message delay, rcvr is the recipi-
ent, and msg is the message content. When time ∆ has elapsed, this message becomes a ripe message
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{T,rcvr <- msg}, where T is the “current global time” (used for analysis purposes only). Such a ripe mes-
sage must be consumed by the receiver rcvr before time advances. The delay ∆ can be sampled from certain
distributions (lognormal, Weibull, etc.) for statistical model checking, or, as mentioned above, removed (or
set to zero) for correctness analysis.
To sample message delays from different distributions, we use the following functionality provided by
Maude: The built-in function random, where random(k) returns the k-th pseudo-random number as a num-
ber between 0 and 232 − 1, and the built-in constant counter with an (implicit) rewrite rule counter =>
N:Nat. The first time counter is rewritten, it rewrites to 0, the next time it rewrites to 1, and so on.
Therefore, each time random(counter) rewrites, it rewrites to the next random number. Since Maude
does not rewrite counter when it appears in the condition of a rewrite rule, we encode a probabilis-
tic rewrite rule t(−→x ) −→ t′(−→x ,−→y ) if cond(−→x ) with probability −→y := pi(−→x ) in Maude as the rule
t(−→x ) −→ t′(−→x , sample(pi(−→x ))) if cond(−→x ). The following operator sampleLogNormal is used to sample a
value from a lognormal distribution with mean MEAN and standard deviation SD:
op sampleLogNormal : Float Float -> [Float] .
eq sampleLogNormal(MEAN,SD) = exp(MEAN + SD * sampleNormal) .
op sampleNormal : -> [Float] .
eq sampleNormal = sampleNormal(float(random(counter) / 4294967296)) .
op sampleNormal : Float -> [Float] .
eq sampleNormal(RAND) = sqrt(- 2.0 * log(RAND)) * cos(2.0 * pi * RAND) .
random(counter) / 4294967296 rewrites to a different “random” number between 0 and 1 each time it is
rewritten, and this is used to define the sampling function. For example, the message delay rd to a remote
site can be sampled from a lognormal distribution with mean 3 and standard deviation 2 as follows:
eq rd = sampleLogNormal(3.0, 2.0) .
Each time rd rewrites, it therefore rewrites to a different delay value according to the above distribution.
5.2. Data Types, Classes, and Messages
We formalize ROLA in an object-oriented style, where the state consists of a number of partition objects,
each modeling a partition of the database, and a number of messages traveling between the objects. A
transaction is formalized as an object which resides inside the partition object that executes the transaction.
5.2.1. Data Types
A version is a timestamped version of a data item (or key) and is modeled as a four-tuple version(key,value,
timestamp,metadata) consisting of the key, its value, and the version’s timestamp and metadata. A times-
tamp is modeled as a pair ts(addr,sqn) consisting of a partition’s identifier addr and a local sequence
number sqn that together uniquely identify a write transaction. Metadata are modeled as a set of keys,
denoting, for each key, the other keys that are written in the same transaction. For example, if a transaction
writes keys x, y, and z, then versions of x have as metadata the set {y, z}.
sorts Key Value Timestamp Version KeySet Versions KeyTimestampEntry KeyTimestamps .
subsort Key < KeySet .
subsort KeyTimeEntry < KeyTimestamps .
subsort Version < Versions .
op ts : Address Nat -> Timestamp .
op version : Key Value Timestamp KeySet -> Version [ctor] .
op empty : -> KeySet [ctor] .
op _,_ : KeySet KeySet -> KeySet [ctor assoc comm id: empty] .
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op empty : -> KeyTimestamps [ctor] .
op _|->_ : Key Timestamp -> KeyTimestampEntry [ctor] .
op _,_ : KeyTimestamps KeyTimestamps -> KeyTimestamps [ctor assoc comm id: empty] .
op nil : -> Versions [ctor] .
op __ : Versions Versions -> Versions [ctor assoc id: nil] .
A set of keys of sort KeySet are built from the constant empty and singleton sets (identified with keys
of sort Key by means of a subsort declaration) with an associative, commutative, and idempotent union
operator _,_. A set of entries, or mappings from keys to timestamps, of sort KeyTimestamps are built
from the constant empty and singleton sets (identified with entries of sort KeyTimestampEntry by means
of a subsort declaration) with an associative, commutative, and idempotent union operator _,_. A list of
versions of sort Versions are built from the constant nil and singleton lists (identified with versions of sort
Version by means of a subsort declaration) with an associative, and idempotent union operator __.
The sort OperationList represents lists of read and write operations as terms such as (x := read k1)
(y := read k2) write(k1, x + y), where LocalVar denotes the “local variable” that stores the value of the
key read by the operation, and Expression is an expression involving the transaction’s local variables:
sorts Expression LocalVar LocalVarEntry LocalVars Operation .
subsort Operation < OperationList .
subsort LocalVarEntry < LocalVars .
op write : Key Expression -> Operation [ctor] .
op _:=read_ : LocalVar Key -> Operation [ctor] .
op nil : -> OperationList [ctor] .
op __ : OperationList OperationList -> OperationList [ctor assoc id: nil] .
op empty : -> LocalVars [ctor] .
op _|->_ : LocalVal Value -> LocalVarEntry [ctor] .
op _,_ : LocalVars LocalVars -> LocalVars [ctor assoc comm id: empty] .
A list of operations of sort OperationList are built from the constant nil and singleton lists (identified
with operations of sort Operation by means of a subsort declaration) with an associative, and idempotent
union operator __. A set of entries, or mappings from local variables to their values, of sort LocalVars are
built from the constant empty and singleton sets (identified with entries of sort LocalVarEntry by means of
a subsort declaration) with an associative, commutative, and idempotent union operator _,_.
We define a collection of votes of sort Vote as a “set” (build with the associative and commutative
operator _;_) of votes, where each vote, as a triple vote(txn,part,result ), indicates the voting result by
some partition for a certain transaction:
sort Vote .
op noVote : -> Vote [ctor] .
op vote : Tid Addr Bool -> Vote [ctor] .
op _;_ : Vote Vote -> Vote [ctor assoc comm id: noVote] .
The data type TxnAddrSet is defined for the situation when a partition is waiting for messages such as
votes from other partitions w.r.t. some transaction:
sorts AddrSet TxnAddrSet .
subsort Address < AddrSet .
op empty : -> AddrSet [ctor] .
op _,_ : AddrSet AddrSet -> AddrSet [ctor assoc comm id: empty] .
op empty : -> TxnAddrSet [ctor] .
op addrs : Tid AddrSet -> TxnAddrSet [ctor] .
op _;_ : TxnAddrSet TxnAddrSet -> TxnAddrSet [ctor assoc comm id: empty] .
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where AddrSet is defined as a “set” of replicas (of sort Address), while TxnAddrSet a mapping from trans-
actions (of sort Tid) to sets of replicas.
5.2.2. Classes
A transaction is modeled as an object of the following class Txn:
class Txn | operations : OperationList, readSet : Versions,
localVars : LocalVars, latest : KeyTimestamps .
The operations attribute denotes the transaction’s operations. The readSet attribute denotes the versions
read by the read operations. localVars maps the transaction’s local variables to their current values. latest
stores the local view as a mapping from keys to their respective latest committed timestamps.
A partition (or site) stores parts of the database, and executes the transactions for which it is the
coordinator/server. A partition is formalized as an object instance of the following class Partition:
class Partition | datastore : Versions, sqn : Nat,
gotTxns : ObjectList, executing : Object,
committed : ObjectList, aborted : ObjectList,
tsSqn : TimestampSqn, latestCommit : KeyTimestamps,
votes : Vote, voteSites : TxnAddrSet,
1stGetSites : TxnAddrSet, 2ndGetSites : TxnAddrSet,
commitSites : TxnAddrSet .
The datastore attribute represents the partition’s local database as a list of versions for each key stored at
the partition. The attribute latestCommit maps each key to the timestamp of its last committed version.
tsSqn maps each version’s timestamp to a local sequence number sqn. The attributes gotTxns, executing,
committed and aborted denote the transaction(s) which are, respectively, waiting to be executed, currently
executing, committed, and aborted. A partition executes transactions sequentially. Concurrent transactions
can be modeled by multiple transactions executed by different partitions.
The attribute votes stores the votes from the partitions which participate in the two-phase commit. The
remaining attributes denote the partitions from which the executing partition is awaiting votes, committed
acks, first-round get replies, and second-round get replies.
The state also contains a “table” mapping each data item to the partition storing the item. Each mapping
is a pair sites(key,part ). The table is built with the associative and commutative operator _;;_ of
mappings.
The following shows an initial state (with some parts replaced by ‘...’) with two partitions, p1 and p2,
that are coordinators for, respectively, transactions t1, t2 and t3. p1 stores the data items x and z, and
p2 stores y. Transaction t1 is the read-only transaction (xl :=read x) (yl :=read y), transaction t2 is
a write-only transaction write(y, 3) write(z, 8), while transaction t3 is a read-write transaction on data
item x. The states also include a buffer of messages in transit and the global clock value, and a table which
assigns to each data item the site storing the item. Initially, the value of each item is [0]; the version’s
timestamp is empty (eptTS), and metadata is an empty set.
eq init = { 0.0 | nil} { 0.0, p1 <- start} { 0.0, p2 <- start}
< tb : Table | table : [sites(x, p1) ;; sites(y, p2) ;; sites(z, p1)] >
< p1 : Partition |
gotTxns: < t1 : Txn | operations: ((xl :=read x) (yl :=read y)), readSet: empty,
latest: empty, localVars: (xl |-> [0], yl |-> [0]) >,
datastore: (version(x, [0], eptTS, empty) version(z, [0], eptTS, empty)),
sqn: 1, executing: noTxn, committed: none, aborted: none, tsSqn: empty,
latestCommit: empty, votes: noVote, voteSites: empty, 1stGetSites: empty,
2ndGetSites: empty, commitSites: empty >
< p2 : Partition |
gotTxns: < t2 : Txn | operations: (write(y, 3) write(z, 8)), ... >
< t3 : Txn | operations: ((xl := read x) write(x, xl plus 1)), ... >
datastore: version(y, [0], eptTS, empty), ... >
where {0.0 | nil} denotes the “scheduler” which holds the list of messages sent but not yet delivered,
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ordered according to their time of delivery (see [4]), with the initial global time 0.0 and the empty list of
messages to be scheduled. The start messages are used to trigger the execution of the first transaction at
each partition.
5.2.3. Messages
As explained in Section 5.1, we have two types of messages [∆,rcvr <- msg] and {T,rcvr <- msg} with
msg the message content of sort Content, and rcvr the identifier of the receiving object:
op _<-_ : Address Content -> Msg .
op [_,_] : Float Msg -> Msg .
op {_,_} : Float Msg -> Msg .
where the current time ∆ and the message delay T are of sort Float of floating-point numbers. The following
presents all message contents used in our ROLA model:
• prepare(txn,version, sender) sends a version from a write-only transaction to its partition;
• prepare(txn,version, ts,sender) does the same thing for other transactions, with ts the timestamp of
the version it has read;
• prepare-reply(txn,vote,sender) is the reply to the corresponding prepare message, where vote tells
whether this partition can commit the transaction;
• commit(txn,ts,sender) marks the versions with timestamp ts as committed;
• get(txn,key,ts,sender) asks for the highest-timestamped committed version or a missing version for
key by timestamp ts;
• response1(txn,version,sender) responds to first-round get request;
• response2(txn,version,sender) responds to second-round get requests;
• commit-reads commits read-only transactions, or completes the reads in read-write transactions; and
• start triggers a partition to start executing transactions.
5.3. Formalizing ROLA’s Behaviors
This section formalizes the dynamic behaviors of ROLA using rewrite rules, referring to the corresponding
lines in Algorithm 1.4
Starting a Transaction (Lines 17 – 22). Triggered by a start message, a partition starts executing a
transaction by moving the first transaction (TID) in gotTxns to executing, if the partition is not currently
already executing a transaction (executing is noTxn). If the new transaction is a write-only transaction
(write-only(OPS)), the partition: (i) uses the function genPuts to generate all prepare messages; (ii) uses
a function prepareSites to remember the sites PIDS from which it awaits votes for transaction TID in the
voteSites attribute; and (iii) increments its local sequence number by one:5
crl [start-wo-txn] :
{T, PID <- start}
< TABLE : Table | table: PARTITION-TABLE >
< PID : Partition |
gotTxns: (< TID : Txn | operations: OPS, localVars: VARS, AS > ;; TXNS),
executing: noTxn, sqn: SQN, voteSites: VSTS, AS’ >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table: PARTITION-TABLE >
< PID : Partition |
gotTxns: TXNS,
executing: < TID : Txn | operations: OPS, localVars: VARS, AS >,
4 We do not include variable declarations, but follow the convention that variables are written in (all) capital letters.
5 The variables AS and AS’ denote the “remaining” attributes in the two objects.
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sqn: SQN’, voteSites: (VSTS ; addrs(TID, PIDS)), AS’ >
genPuts(OPS,PID,TID,SQN’,VARS,PARTITION-TABLE)
if SQN’ := SQN + 1 /\ write-only(OPS) /\
PIDS := prepareSites(OPS, PID, PARTITION-TABLE) .
The above function genPuts is defined as follows:
op genPuts : OperationList Address Address Nat LocalVars ReplicaTable -> Config .
op $genPuts : OperationList Address Address Nat LocalVars ReplicaTable
OperationList -> Config .
eq genPuts(OPS,PID,TID,SQN,VARS,PARTITION-TABLE)
= $genPuts(OPS,PID,TID,SQN,VARS,PARTITION-TABLE,OPS) .
eq $genPuts((write(K,EXPR) OPS),PID,TID,SQN,VARS,PARTITION-TABLE,(OPS’ write(K,EXPR) OPS’’))
= $genPuts(OPS,PID,TID,SQN,VARS,PARTITION-TABLE,(OPS’ write(K,EXPR) OPS’’))
(if localReplica(K,PID,PARTITION-TABLE)
then [ld, PID <-
prepare(TID,version(K,eval(EXPR,VARS),ts(PID,SQN),md(OPS’ OPS’’)),PID)]
else [rd, preferredSite(K,PARTITION-TABLE) <-
prepare(TID,version(K,eval(EXPR,VARS),ts(PID,SQN),md(OPS’ OPS’’)),PID)]
fi) .
eq $genPuts(((X :=read K) OPS),PID,TID,SQN,VARS,PARTITION-TABLE,OPS’)
= $genPuts(OPS,PID,TID,SQN,VARS,PARTITION-TABLE,OPS’) .
eq $genPuts(nil,PID,TID,SQN,VARS,PARTITION-TABLE,OPS’) = null .
Otherwise, if the first transaction in gotTxns is a read-only or read-write transaction, the replica updates
1stGetSites instead to keep track of the replicas from which it receives the versions from the first-round
gets. The function genGets generates all get messages for the keys concerned by TID (see the executable
specification available online for the definition of this, and other, functions). The expression 1stSites gives
the corresponding replicas for those keys:
crl [start-ro-or-rw-txn] :
{T, PID <- start}
< TABLE : Table | table: PARTITION-TABLE >
< PID : Partition | gotTxns:
(< TID : Txn | operations: OPS, latest: empty, AS > ;; TXNS),
executing: noTxn,
1stGetSites: 1STGETS, AS’ >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table: PARTITION-TABLE >
< PID : Partition | gotTxns: TXNS,
executing: < TID : Txn | operations: OPS, latest: vl(OPS), AS >,
1stGetSites: (1STGETS ; addrs(TID,PIDS)), AS’ >
genGets(OPS,PID,TID,PARTITION-TABLE)
if (not write-only(OPS)) /\
PIDS := 1stSites(OPS,PID,PARTITION-TABLE) .
Receiving prepare Messages (Lines 5–10). When a partition receives a prepare message for a read-
write transaction, the partition first determines whether the timestamp of the last version (VERSION) in its
local version list VS matches the incoming timestamp TS’ (which is the timestamp of the version read by the
transaction). If so, the incoming version is added to the local store, the map tsSqn is updated, and a positive
reply (true) to the prepare message is sent (“return ack” in our pseudo-code); otherwise, a negative reply
(false, or “return latest” in the pseudo-code) is sent. Depending on whether the sender PID’ of the prepare
message happens to be PID itself, the reply is equipped with a local message delay ld or a remote message
delay rd, both of which are sampled probabilistically from distributions with different parameters:
crl [receive-prepare-rw] :
{T, PID <- prepare(TID, version(K, V, TS, MD), TS’, PID’)}
< PID : Partition | datastore: VS, sqn: SQN, tsSqn: TSSQN, AS’ >
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=>
if VERSION == eptVersion or tstamp(VERSION) == TS’
then < PID : Partition | datastore: (VS version(K,V,TS,MD)), sqn: SQN’,
tsSqn: insert(TS,SQN’,TSSQN), AS’ >
[if PID == PID’ then ld else rd fi,
PID’ <- prepare-reply(TID, true, PID)]
else < PID : Partition | datastore: VS, sqn: SQN, tsSqn: TSSQN, AS’ >
[if PID == PID’ then ld else rd fi,
PID’ <- prepare-reply(TID, false, PID)] fi
if SQN’ := SQN + 1 /\ VERSION := latestPrepared(K,VS) .
If instead the received prepare message was for a write-only transaction, the replica simply adds the
received version to its local datastore, and maps the associated timestamp to the incremented sequence
number (insert(TS,SQN’,TSSQN)). Depending on whether the message sender PID’ is the replica itself, the
out-going message is equipped with a local message delay ld or a remote message delay rd. Both delays,
as mentioned above, are sampled from certain distributions. Note that case (i) always considers successful
preparations.
crl [receive-prepare-wo] :
{T, PID <- prepare(TID,version(K,V,TS,MD),PID’)}
< PID : Partition | datastore: VS,
sqn: SQN,
tsSqn: TSSQN, AS’ >
=>
< PID : Partition | datastore: (VS version(K,V,TS,MD)),
sqn: SQN’,
tsSqn: insert(TS,SQN’,TSSQN), AS’ >
[if PID == PID’ then ld else rd fi, PID’ <- prepare-reply(TID,true,PID)]
if SQN’ := SQN + 1 .
In case (ii), the replica first determines whether the timestamp of the last VERSION in the local version
list VS matches the incoming timestamp TS’ which is the timestamp associated with the version fetched by
the previous get in the same read-write transaction. If matched, the incoming version is added to the local
datastore; otherwise, a negative ack (denoted by false) is sent back:
crl [receive-prepare-rw] :
{T, PID <- prepare(TID,version(K,V,TS,MD),TS’,PID’)}
< PID : Partition | datastore: VS,
sqn: SQN,
tsSqn: TSSQN, AS’ >
=>
if VERSION == eptVersion or tstamp(VERSION) == TS’
then < PID : Partition | datastore: (VS version(K,V,TS,MD)),
sqn: SQN’,
tsSqn: insert(TS,SQN’,TSSQN), AS’ >
[if PID == PID’ then ld else rd fi,
PID’ <- prepare-reply(TID,true,PID)]
else < PID : Partition | datastore: VS,
sqn: SQN,
tsSqn: TSSQN, AS’ >
[if PID == PID’ then ld else rd fi,
PID’ <- prepare-reply(TID,false,PID)]
fi
if SQN’ := SQN + 1 /\ VERSION := latestPrepared(K,VS) .
Receiving Negative Replies (Lines 23–24). When a site receives a prepare-reply message with vote
false, it aborts the transaction by moving it to the aborted list, and removes PID’ from the “vote waiting
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list” for this transaction. If the transaction has been aborted, the incoming prepare-reply message is simply
consumed by the replica:
rl [receive-prepare-reply-false-executing] :
{T, PID <- prepare-reply(TID, false, PID’)}
< PID : Partition | executing: < TID : Txn | AS >,
aborted: TXNS,
voteSites: VSTS addrs(TID, (PID’ , PIDS)), AS’ >
=>
< PID : Partition | executing: noTxn,
aborted: (TXNS ;; < TID : Txn | AS >),
voteSites: VSTS addrs(TID, PIDS), AS’ >
[0.0, PID <- start] .
rl [receive-prepare-reply-aborted] :
{T, PID <- prepare-reply(TID,FLAG,PID’)}
< PID : Partition | aborted: (TXNS ;; < TID : Txn | AS > ;; TXNS’),
voteSites: VSTS, AS’ >
=>
< PID : Partition | aborted: (TXNS ;; < TID : Txn | AS > ;; TXNS’),
voteSites: remove(TID,PID’,VSTS), AS’ > .
where, in the first case, a start message without delay is sent to the partition itself to trigger the execution
of next transaction.
Receiving Acks (Lines 26–28). Upon receiving a “true" vote (prepare-reply(...,true,...)), the
replica first checks whether all votes have now been collected. The expression VSTS’[TID] projects for TID
the remaining replicas from which it is awaiting votes. If all received votes are “yes,” the replica starts to
commit TID at the associated replicas by invoking genCommits to generate all commit messages with the
commit timestamp including the current sequence number SQN. The replica also adds to commitSites the
replicas from which it is awaiting committed messages to commit the transaction:
crl [receive-prepare-reply-true-executing] :
{T, PID <- prepare-reply(TID,true,PID’)}
< TABLE : Table | table: PARTITION-TABLE >
< PID : Partition | executing: < TID : Txn | operations: OPS, AS >,
voteSites: VSTS, sqn: SQN,
commitSites: CMTS, AS’ >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table: PARTITION-TABLE >
if VSTS’[TID] == empty --- all votes received and all yes!
then < PID : Partition | executing: < TID : Txn | operations: OPS, AS >,
voteSites: VSTS’, sqn: SQN,
commitSites: (CMTS ; addrs(TID,PIDS)), AS’ >
genCommits(TID,SQN,PIDS,PID)
else < PID : Partition | executing: < TID : Txn | operations: OPS, AS >,
voteSites: VSTS’, sqn: SQN,
commitSites: CMTS, AS’ >
fi
if VSTS’ := remove(TID,PID’,VSTS) /\
PIDS := commitSites(OPS,PID,PARTITION-TABLE) .
Receiving commit Messages (Lines 13–16). Upon receiving a commit message, the partition invokes
the function cmt to commit the transaction. cmt looks up tsSqn for the commit timestamp TS and the
latest committed version’s timestamp in LC, and updates the latest committed version if TS’s local sequence
number is higher. A committed message is then sent back to confirm the commit:
rl [receive-commit] :
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{T, PID <- commit(TID, TS, PID’)}
< PID : Partition | tsSqn: TSSQN, datastore: VS, latestCommit: LC, AS’ >
=>
< PID : Partition | tsSqn: TSSQN, datastore: VS,
latestCommit: cmt(LC, VS, TSSQN, TS), AS’ >
[if PID == PID’ then ld else rd fi, PID’ <- committed(TID, PID)] .
Receiving committedMessages. (For partitions to commit transactions locally). Upon receiving a committed
message, the replica first checks if all committed messages have now been collected. The expression CMTS’[TID]
projects for TID the remaining replicas from which it is awaiting committed messages. If the projection is
empty, the replica commits the transaction:
crl [receive-committed] :
{T, PID <- committed(TID,PID’)}
< PID : Partition | executing: < TID : Txn | AS >,
committed: TXNS, commitSites: CMTS, AS’ >
=>
if CMTS’[TID] == empty --- all "committed" received
then < PID : Partition | executing: noTxn,
committed: (TXNS ;; < TID : Txn | AS >),
commitSites: CMTS’, AS’ >
[0.0, PID <- start]
else < PID : Partition | executing: < TID : Txn | AS >,
committed: TXNS,
commitSites: CMTS’, AS’ >
fi
if CMTS’ := remove(TID,PID’,CMTS) .
where a start message is issued out for the execution of next transaction.
Receiving get Messages (Lines 9–13 in RAMP-Fast, Appendix A). Upon receiving a get message,
depending on the associated timestamp TS (if TS is an empty timestamp eptTS, the incoming message is
the first-round get; otherwise, it is the second-round get), the replica replies with the corresponding version
determined by the function vmatch. For a first-round get, vmatch looks up LC for the latest committed
version; for the second-round get, vmatch returns the matched timestamped version of TS:
rl [receive-get] :
{T, PID <- get(TID,K,TS,PID’)}
< PID : Partition | datastore: VS, latestCommit: LC, AS’ >
=>
< PID : Partition | datastore: VS, latestCommit: LC, AS’ >
[if PID == PID’ then ld else rd fi,
PID’ <- (if TS == eptTS then response1(TID,vmatch(K,VS,LC),PID)
else response2(TID,vmatch(K,VS,TS),PID) fi)] .
Receiving Replies to First-Round Gets (Lines 27–32 in RAMP-Fast, Appendix A). Upon re-
ceiving a returned version for the first-round get, the replica adds it to the read set, and updates localVars
accordingly. When the replica has collected all replies to the first-round gets, it determines whether a second-
round get is needed. The expression gen2ndGets(TID,VL’,RS’,PID,PARTITION-TABLE) generates possible
second-round get messages based on the updated latest, VL’, and readSet, RS’. In case a second-round
get is not needed, gen2ndGets generates no message (and thus the commit-reads message will trigger the
partition to execute next transaction), and PIDS is an empty set. Note that RS’ is needed if TID is a read-write
transaction:
crl [receive-response1] :
{T, PID <- response1(TID,version(K,V,TS,MD),PID’)}
< TABLE : Table | table: PARTITION-TABLE >
< PID : Partition | executing:
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< TID : Txn | operations: (OPS (X :=read K) OPS’),
readSet: RS, localVars: VARS, latest: VL, AS >,
1stGetSites: 1STGETS,
2ndGetSites: 2NDGETS, AS’ >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table: PARTITION-TABLE >
if 1STGETS’[TID] == empty
then < PID : Partition | executing:
< TID : Txn | operations: (OPS (X :=read K) OPS’),
readSet: RS’, localVars: insert(X,V,VARS),
latest: VL’, AS >,
1stGetSites: 1STGETS’,
2ndGetSites: (2NDGETS ; addrs(TID,PIDS)), AS’ >
gen2ndGets(TID,VL’,RS’,PID,PARTITION-TABLE)
[0.0, PID <- commit-reads]
else < PID : Partition | executing:
< TID : Txn | operations: (OPS (X :=read K) OPS’),
readSet: RS’, localVars: insert(X,V,VARS),
latest: VL’, AS >,
1stGetSites: 1STGETS’,
2ndGetSites: 2NDGETS, AS’ >
fi
if RS’ := RS version(K,V,TS,MD) /\
VL’ := lat(VL,MD,TS) /\
1STGETS’ := remove(TID,PID’,1STGETS) /\
PIDS := 2ndSites(VL’,RS’,PID,PARTITION-TABLE) .
Receiving Replies to Second-Round Gets (Lines 32–33 in RAMP-Fast, Appendix A). Upon
receiving a returned version for the second-round get, the partition simply overwrites the version fetched
by the first-round get (the readSet is updated). It then updates the local variables localVars and the
remaining replicas from which it is awaiting second-round gets:
rl [receive-response2] :
{T, PID <- response2(TID,version(K,V,TS,MD),PID’)}
< PID : Partition | executing:
< TID : Txn | operations: (OPS (X :=read K) OPS’),
readSet: (RS version(K,V’,TS’,MD’) RS’),
localVars: VARS, AS >,
2ndGetSites: 2NDGETS, AS’ >
=>
< PID : Partition | executing:
< TID : Txn | operations: (OPS (X :=read K) OPS’),
readSet: (RS version(K,V,TS,MD) RS’),
localVars: insert(X,V,VARS), AS >,
2ndGetSites: remove(TID,PID’,2NDGETS), AS’ >
[0.0, PID <- commit-reads] .
where a commit-reads message is issued out for the execution of next transaction.
Committing Reads (Lines 18–22). Upon receiving the commit-reads message, if the replica has no re-
maining replicas from which it is awaiting replies to either first-round gets or second-round gets (1STGETS[TID]
== empty and 2NDGETS[TID] == empty), it starts to commit the reads. There are two cases to consider: (i)
a read-only transaction; or (ii) a read-write transaction.
In case (i), the replica simply puts TID in committed, and sends out a start message to start executing
the next transaction; in case (ii), the replica further generates all prepare messages for each version concerned
with newly generated timestamp including the incremented sequence number SQN’. The prepared versions
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are computed based on the previously fetched reads reflected in VARS, and the prepare messages also include
the timestamps of the previously fetched reads in RS:
crl [commit-reads] :
{T, PID <- commit-reads}
< TABLE : Table | table: PARTITION-TABLE >
< PID : Partition | executing: < TID : Txn | operations: OPS,
localVars: VARS,
readSet: RS, AS >,
committed: TXNS, 1stGetSites: 1STGETS,
2ndGetSites: 2NDGETS, sqn: SQN, voteSites: VSTS, AS’ >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table: PARTITION-TABLE >
if read-only(OPS)
then < PID : Partition | executing: noTxn,
committed: (TXNS ;;
< TID : Txn | operations: OPS, localVars: VARS,
readSet: RS, AS >),
1stGetSites: 1STGETS, 2ndGetSites: 2NDGETS,
sqn: SQN, voteSites: VSTS, AS’ >
[0.0, PID <- start]
else < PID : Partition | executing: < TID : Txn | operations: OPS,
localVars: VARS, readSet: RS, AS >,
committed: TXNS, 1stGetSites: 1STGETS,
2ndGetSites: 2NDGETS, sqn: SQN’,
voteSites: (VSTS ; voteSites(TID,PIDS)), AS’ >
genPuts(OPS,PID,TID,SQN’,VARS,RS,PARTITION-TABLE)
fi
if 1STGETS[TID] == empty /\ 2NDGETS[TID] == empty /\
SQN’ := SQN + 1 /\ PIDS := prepareSites(OPS,PID,PARTITION-TABLE) .
6. Model Checking Correctness Properties of ROLA
Section 4 gives an informal “proof” that ROLA guarantees RA and PLU. However, it is well known that such
“hand proofs” may be erroneous or may make crucial assumptions that are not made explicit. Indeed, we have
experienced that Maude model checking can uncover nontrivial errors as well as both missing and unclear
assumption in a supposedly verified distributed transaction system that is less complex than ROLA [30]. To
gain further confidence in the correctness of ROLA—before undertaking the hard task of formally verifying
ROLA—we therefore use Maude model checking to analyze ROLA’s correctness.
This section shows how Maude can be used to formalize the RA and PLU requirements, and how Maude
reachability analysis can be used to analyze whether or not ROLA guarantees RA and PLU. We also formalize
and analyze whether or not ROLA satisfies CC. In particular, we add to the state a monitor object which
records relevant history during a run of the protocol. We then formalize in Maude what it means that such
a history satisfies RA, PLU, and CC. Finally, we use Maude reachability analysis to analyze whether all
possible runs starting from four different concrete initial states satisfy the three properties.
6.1. Recording the History of a Run
For both correctness and performance analysis, we add to the state an object
< m : Monitor | log: log >
which stores crucial information about each transaction. The log is a collection of records, with one record for
each transaction, where each record has the form record(tid, issueTime,finishTime, reads,writes, committed),
with tid the transaction’s ID, issueTime its issue time, finishTime its commit/abort time, reads the versions
read, writes the versions written, and committed a flag that is true if the transaction is committed.
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We modify our model by updating the Monitor when needed. We show three examples below.
Start a Transaction. When the coordinator starts to execute a transaction, the monitor appends a new
record for that transaction TID with the initial values T for the issueTime, 0.0 for finishTime, empty for
the read and write sets, and with the committed flag set to false.6 The global time T is obtained from the
delivery time of the received start message:
crl [start-ro-or-rw-txn] :
< M : Monitor | log: LOG >
{T, PID <- start}
< TABLE : Table | table: PARTITION-TABLE >
< PID : Partition | gotTxns: (< TID : Txn | operations: OPS,
latest: empty, AS > ;; TXNS),
executing: noTxn,
1stGetSites: 1STGETS, AS’ >
=>
< M : Monitor | log: (LOG ; record(TID,T,0.0,empty,empty,false)) >
< TABLE : Table | table: PARTITION-TABLE >
< PID : Partition | gotTxns: TXNS,
executing: < TID : Txn | operations: OPS,
latest: vl(OPS), AS >,
1stGetSites: (1STGETS ; addrs(TID,RIDS)), AS’ >
genGets(OPS,RID,TID,PARTITION-TABLE)
if (not write-only(OPS)) /\
RIDS := 1stSites(OPS,RID,PARTITION-TABLE) .
Commit a Transaction. When the coordinator has received all committed messages, the monitor records
the commit time (T) for that transaction, and sets the “committed” flag to true:
crl [receive-committed] :
< M : Monitor | log: (LOG ; record(TID, T’, T’’, RS, WS, false) ; LOG’) >
{T, PID <- committed(TID, PID’)}
< PID : Partition | executing: < TID : Txn | AS >,
committed: TXNS, commitSites: CMTS, AS’ >
=>
if CMTS’[TID] == empty --- all "committed" received
then < M : Monitor | log: (LOG ; record(TID, T’, T, RS, WS, true) ; LOG’) >
< PID : Partition | executing: noTxn, commitSites: CMTS’,
committed: (TXNS ;; < TID : Txn | AS >, AS’ >
else < M : Monitor | log: (LOG ; record(TID, T’, T’’, RS, WS, false) ; LOG’) >
< PID : Partition | executing: < TID : Txn | AS >,
committed: TXNS, commitSites: CMTS’, AS’ > fi
if CMTS’ := remove(TID, PID’, CMTS) .
Abort a Transaction. When the coordinator receives a false vote, it aborts the transaction. The monitor
records the abort/finish time T for that transaction (and the “committed” flag remains false):
rl [receive-prepare-reply-false-executing] :
< M : Monitor | log: (LOG ; record(TID,T1,0.0,RS,WS,false) ; LOG’) >
{T, RID <- prepare-reply(TID,false,RID’)}
< PID : Partition | executing: < TID : Txn | AS >,
aborted: TXNS,
voteSites: VSTS, AS’ >
=>
< M : Monitor | log: (LOG ; record(TID,T1, T,RS,WS,false) ; LOG’) >
6 The additions to the original rule are written in italics.
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< PID : Partition | executing: noTxn,
aborted: (TXNS ;; < TID : Txn | AS >),
voteSites: remove(TID,RID’,VSTS), AS’ > .
6.2. Formalizing and Analyzing RA, PLU, and CC
Since ROLA is terminating if only a finite number of transactions are issued, we analyze the different
(correctness and performance) properties by inspecting this monitor object in the final states, when all
transactions are finished. That is, we use reachability analysis to check whether there exists a final state
where the log shows that the run violated the desired property.
6.2.1. Read Atomicity
A system guarantees RA if it prevents fractured reads, and also prevents transactions from reading uncom-
mitted, aborted, or intermediate data [7]. A transaction Tj exhibits fractured reads if transaction Ti writes
version xm and yn, Tj reads version xm and version yk, and k < n [7].
We analyze this property by searching for a reachable final state (arrow =>!) where the property does
not hold, which is done with the following Maude command:
Maude> search [1] initConfig =>! C:Config < M:Address : Monitor | log: LOG:Record >
such that fracRead(LOG:Record) or abortedRead(LOG:Record) .
The function fracRead checks whether there are fractured reads in the execution log. There is a fractured
read if a transaction TID2 reads X and Y, transaction TID1 writes X and Y, TID2 reads the version TSX of X
written by TID1, and reads a version TSY’ of Y written before TSY (TSY’ < TSY). Since the transactions in
the log are ordered according to start time, TID2 could appear before or after TID1 in the log. We spell out
the case when TID1 comes before TID2:
op fracRead : Record -> Bool .
ceq fracRead(LOG ;
record(TID1,T1,T1’,RS1, (version(X,VX,TSX,MDX), version(Y,VY,TSY,MDY)),true) ; LOG’ ;
record(TID2,T2,T2’,(version(X,VX,TSX,MDX), version(Y,VY’,TSY’,MDY’)), WS2,true) ; LOG’’)
= true if TSY’ < TSY .
ceq fracRead(LOG ; record(TID2, ...) ; LOG’ ; record(TID1, ...) ; LOG’’) = true if TSY’ < TSY .
eq fracRead(LOG) = false [owise] .
The function abortedRead checks whether a transaction TID2 reads a version TSX that was written by
an aborted (flag false) transaction TID1. The first equation handles the case when TID1 comes before TID2
in the log, and the second equation treats the opposite case:
op abortedRead : Record -> Bool .
eq abortedRead(LOG ;
record(TID1, T1, T1’, RS1, (version(X,VX,TSX,MDX), VS), false ) ; LOG’ ;
record(TID2, T2, T2’, (version(X,VX,TSX,MDX), VS), WS2, true) ; LOG’’) = true .
eq abortedRead(LOG ; record(TID2,...) ; LOG’ ; record(TID1,...) ; LOG’’) = true.
eq abortedRead(LOG) = false [owise] .
6.2.2. Prevention of Lost Updates
We analyze the PLU property by searching for a final state in which the monitor shows that an update was
lost:
Maude> search [1] initConfig =>! C:Config < M:Address : Monitor | log: LOG:Record >
such that lu(LOG:Record) .
The function lu checks whether there are lost updates in LOG.
Lost updates happen when two transactions simultaneously make conditional updates to the same data
item(s). Specifically, when the read sets of the two transactions overlap on data item x (meaning that both
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have fetched the same data of x), and x is in the write sets of the both transactions (meaning that both try
to modify x), one update will be overwritten by the other, and thus an update is lost. Our specification of
lu captures this by checking whether there are two transactions in log reading the same data (matched by
version(X,VX,TSX,MDX) in the read set), and they both commit their writes on that key (matched by the
key X in the write set):
op lu : Record -> Bool .
eq lu(LOG ; record(TID1,T1,T1’,(version(X,VX,TSX,MDX),VS1),
(version(X,VX1,TSX1,MDX1),VS3),true) ; LOG’ ;
record(TID2,T2,T2’,(version(X,VX,TSX,MDX),VS2),
(version(X,VX2,TSX2,MDX2),VS4),true) ; LOG’’) = true .
eq lu(LOG) = false [owise] .
6.2.3. Causal Consistency
We analyze the CC property by searching for a final state in which the monitor shows a violation of causal
consistency:
Maude> search [1] initConfig =>! C:Config < M:Address : Monitor | log: LOG:Record >
such that notCausal(LOG:Record) .
The function notCausal checks whether there are transactions not respecting the causal order. The trans-
action T2 reads T1’s write (matched by version(X,VX,TSX,MDX), so T2 causally depends on T1. Similarly,
the transaction T3 reads T2’s write (matched by version(Y,VY’,TSY’,MDY’), so T3 causally depends on T2.
Since causality is transitive, T3 must causally depend on T1. However, T3 reads a different version VX’, thus
violating causality:
op notCausal : Record -> Bool .
ceq notCausal(LOG1 ; record(TID1,T1,T1’,RS,(version(X,VX,TSX,MDX),
version(Y,VY,TSY,MDY),VS1),true) ; LOG2 ;
record(TID2,T2,T2’,(version(X,VX,TSX,MDX),VS2),
(version(Y,VY’,TSY’,MDY’),VS3),true) ; LOG3 ;
record(TID3,T3,T3’,((version(X,VX’,TSX’,MDX’),
version(Y,VY’,TSY’,MDY’),VS4),WS,true) ; LOG4)
= true if VX =/= VX’ .
eq notCausal(LOG) = false [owise] .
6.2.4. Model Checking Results
We have performed our analysis with 4 different initial states, with up to 8 transactions, 2 data items and
4 partitions7, without finding a violation of RA or PLU. However, our Maude analysis from the same initial
states found a violation of CC (which is not guaranteed by ROLA) from those same initial states. Each
analysis command took about 30 seconds to execute on a 2.9 GHz Intel 4-Core i7-3520M CPU with 3.7 GB
memory.
7. Statistical Model Checking of ROLA, Jessy and Walter
The weakest consistency models in [11, 6] guaranteeing RA and PLU are PSI and NMSI, and the main
systems providing PSI and NMSI are, respectively, Walter [34] and Jessy [6]. To be an attractive design
option, ROLA should outperform both Walter and Jessy. To quickly check whether ROLA indeed does
so, we have also modeled Walter and Jessy—without their data replication features—in Maude (see https:
//sites.google.com/site/siliunobi/fac-rola), and have used statistical model checking with PVeStA
to compare the performance of ROLA, Walter, and Jessy in terms of throughput, average transaction latency,
and transaction commit rate.
7 Two of those “partitions” will not store any data item, but those sites will serve/execute transactions.
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Section 7.1 explains how we can extract the difference performance measures from the log introduced in
Section 6. Section 7.2 explains how we generate workloads (transactions; which site to serve a transaction;
and so on) probabilistically, and Section 7.3 summarizes the results of estimating the performance of ROLA,
Walter, and Jessy using PVeStA.
7.1. Extracting Performance Measures from Executions
PVeStA estimates the expected (average) value of an expression on a run, up to a desired statistical
confidence. The key to perform statistical model checking is therefore to define a measure on runs. Using
the monitor in Section 6 we can define a number of functions on (states with) such a monitor that extract
different performance metrics from this “system execution log”.
Throughput. The function throughput computes the number of committed transactions per time unit.
committedNumber computes the number of committed transactions in LOG, and totalRunTime returns the
time when all transactions are finished (i.e., the largest finishTime in LOG):
op throughput : Config -> Float [frozen] .
eq throughput(< M : Monitor | log: LOG > REST) = committedNumber(LOG) / totalRunTime(LOG) .
op committedNumber : Record -> Float .
op $committedNumber : Record Float -> Float .
eq committedNumber(LOG) = $committedNumber(LOG,0.0) .
eq $committedNumber((record(TID,T1,T2,READS,WRITES,true) ; LOG),NUMBER)
= $committedNumber(LOG,NUMBER + 1.0) .
eq $committedNumber((record(TID,T1,T2,READS,WRITES,false) ; LOG),NUMBER)
= $committedNumber(LOG,NUMBER) .
eq $committedNumber(noRecord,NUMBER) = NUMBER .
Average Latency. The function avgLatency computes the average transaction latency by dividing the
sum of the latencies of all committed transactions by the number of such transactions:
op avgLatency : Config -> Float [frozen] .
eq avgLatency(< M : Monitor | log: LOG > REST) = totalLatency(LOG) / committedNumber(LOG) .
where totalLatency uses the auxiliary function $totalLatency to compute the sum of all transaction
latencies (time between the issue time and the finish time of a committed transaction).
op totalLatency : Record -> Float .
op $totalLatency : Record Float -> Float .
eq totalLatency(LOG) = $totalLatency(LOG,0.0) .
eq $totalLatency((record(TID,T1,T2,READS,WRITES,true ) ; LOG),LATENCY)
= $totalLatency(LOG,LATENCY + T2 - T1) .
eq $totalLatency((record(TID,T1,T2,READS,WRITES,false ) ; LOG),LATENCY) =
= $totalLatency(LOG,LATENCY) .
eq $totalLatency(noRecord,LATENCY) = LATENCY .
Commit Rate. The function cmtRate computes the transaction commit rate by dividing the number of
committed transactions by the total number of transactions:
op cmtRate : Config -> Float .
eq cmtRate(< M : Monitor | log: LOG > C) = committedNumber(LOG) / totalNumber(LOG) .
The function totalNumber returns the total number of (either committed or aborted) transactions; i.e., the
number of records in the LOG:
op totalNumber : Record -> Float .
op $totalNumber : Record Float -> Float .
eq totalNumber(LOG) = $totalNumber(LOG,0.0) .
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eq $totalNumber((record(TID,T1,T2,READS,WRITES,FLAG) ; LOG),NUMBER)
= $totalNumber(LOG,NUMBER + 1.0) .
eq $totalNumber(noRecord,NUMBER) = NUMBER .
7.2. Generating Initial States
We use an operator init to probabilistically generate initial states:
init(rtx,wtx, rwtx, part, keys, rops,wops, rwops, distr)
generates an initial state with rtx read-only transactions, wtx write-only transactions, rwtx read-write trans-
actions, part partitions, keys data items, rops operations per read-only transaction, wops operations per
write-only transaction, rwops operations per read-write transactions, and distr the key access distribution
(the probability that an operation accesses a certain data item). To capture the fact that some data items
may be accessed more frequently than others, we also use Zipfian distributions in our experiments.
Each PVeStA simulation starts from init(parameters), which rewrites to a different initial state in each
simulation. The reason is that this expression involves generating certain values—such as the transactions—
probabilistically.
init is defined by first generating the table, the scheduler, and the monitor:
op init : NzNat NzNat NzNat NzNat NzNat
NzNat NzNat NzNat KeyAccessDistr -> Config .
op $init : NzNat NzNat NzNat NzNat NzNat KeyVars KeyVars
NzNat NzNat NzNat KeyAccessDistr Config -> Config .
op $$init : NzNat NzNat NzNat NzNat NzNat KeyVars KeyVars
NzNat NzNat NzNat KeyAccessDistr Nat Config -> Config .
eq init(RTX,WTX,RWTX,PS,KS,ROPS,WOPS,RWOPS,KAD) =
= { 0.0 | nil } < 0 . 2 : Monitor | log: noRecord >
$init(RTX,WTX,RWTX,PS,PS,kvars(KS,keyVars),kvars(KS,keyVars),ROPS,WOPS,RWOPS,KAD,
< 0 . 1 : Table | table: [emptyTable] >) .
where $init and $$init are two auxiliary functions which continue to generate and update other objects.
kvars cuts out the first KS number of key-local var pairs, < k1 , k1 l > ; < k2 , k2 l > ; ... ; < kks, kksl >, from
all constant key-local pairs.
Then $init uniformly assigns each key to a partition; assignKey also updates the table with the assigned
key and its partition:
eq $init(RTX,WTX,RWTX,0,REPLS2,(< K,VAR > ; KVARS),KVARS’,ROPS,WOPS,RWOPS,KAD,C)
= $init(RTX,WTX,RWTX,0,REPLS2,KVARS,KVARS’,ROPS,WOPS,RWOPS,KAD,
assignKey(K,sampleUniWithInt(REPLS2) + 1,C)) .
op assignKey : Key Address Config -> Config .
eq assignKey(K,PID,< PID : Partition | datastore: VS, AS >
< TB : Table | table: [KEYREPLICAS] > C)
= < PID : Partition | datastore: (VS version(K,[0],eptTS,empty)), AS >
< TB : Table | table: [replicatingSites(K,PID) ;; KEYREPLICAS] > C .
where eptTS is the default timestamp.
The function $init then generates transactions when all keys have been assigned (denoted by noKeyVar).
The following case shows when there are non-zero8 read, write, and read-write transactions left to generate:
eq $init(s RTX,s WTX,s RWTX,0,PS’,noKeyVar,KVARS’, ROPS,WOPS,RWOPS,KAD,C)
= $$init(s RTX,s WTX,s RWTX,0,PS’,noKeyVar,KVARS’,ROPS,WOPS,RWOPS,
KAD,sampleUniWithInt(s RTX + s WTX + s RWTX),C) .
8 ‘s’ denotes the successor function on natural numbers, and there are s RTX, s WTX, and s RWTX transactions of the three
different types left to generate.
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eq $$init(s RTX, s WTX, s RWTX, 0, PS’, noKeyVar, KVARS’, ROPS, WOPS, RWOPS, KAD, R-OR-W-OR-RW, C)
= if R-OR-W-OR-RW < s RTX --- generate read-only txns
then $init(RTX, s WTX, s RWTX, 0, PS’, noKeyVar, KVARS’, ROPS, WOPS, RWOPS, KAD,
addRTxn(sampleUniWithInt(PS’) + 1, ROPS, KVARS’, KAD, C))
else if s RTX <= R-OR-W-OR-RW and R-OR-W-OR-RW < s RTX + s WTX
--- generate write-only txns
then $init(s RTX, WTX, s RWTX, 0, PS’, noKeyVar, KVARS’, ROPS,
WOPS, RWOPS, KAD, addWTxn(sampleUniWithInt(PS’) + 1, WOPS, KVARS’, KAD, C))
else --- generate read-write txns
$init(s RTX, s WTX, RWTX, 0, PS’, noKeyVar, KVARS’, ROPS, WOPS, RWOPS, KAD,
addRWTxn(sampleUniWithInt(PS’) + 1, RWOPS, KVARS’, KAD, C))
fi fi .
This equation first probabilistically decides whether the next transaction is a read-only, a write-only, or
a read-write transaction. Since the probability of picking a read transaction should be #readsLeft#txnLeft , it uni-
formly picks a value R-OR-W-OR-RW from [0, . . . ,#txnLeft − 1] (the number of transactions left to gener-
ate is s RTX + s WTX + s RWTX) using the expression sampleUniWithInt(s RTX + s WTX + s RWTX). If the
value picked is in [0, . . . ,#readsLeft − 1] (< s RTX), we generate a new read-only transaction next (then
branch); otherwise, in a similar way, we generate a new write-only transaction (else-if-then branch),
or a new read-write transaction (else-if-else branch). But which partition should get the transaction?
The partitions have identities 1, 2, . . . , n, where n is the number of partitions (PS’). The expression
sampleUniWithInt(PS’) + 1 gives us the partition, sampled uniformly from [1, . . . , n].
Similarly, we treat other cases based on the type(s) of the remaining transactions. We omit the details.
The following defines the functions addRTxn which generates a new read-only transaction:
op addRTxn : Address Nat KeyVars KeyAccessDistr Config -> Config .
op $addRTxn : Config -> Config . --- generate local variables
--- if this is the first read-only txn to generate
eq addRTxn(RID, ROPS, KVARS, KAD,
< PID : Partition | gotTxns: emptyTxnList, AS > C)
= $addRTxn(< PID : Partition |
gotTxns: < PID . 1 : Txn | operations: addReads(ROPS, KVARS, KAD),
readSet: nil, latest: empty,
localVars: empty, txnSQN: 0 >, AS >) C .
--- if there is already some txn(s) generated
eq addRTxn(RID, ROPS, KVARS, KAD,
< PID : Partition | gotTxns: (TXNS ;; < PID . N : Txn | AS’ >), AS > C)
= $addRTxn(< PID : Partition |
gotTxns: (TXNS ;; < PID . N : Txn | AS’ > ;;
< PID . (N + 1) : Txn | operations: addReads(ROPS,KVARS,KAD),
readSet: nil, latest: empty,
localVars: empty, txnSQN: 0 >), AS >) C .
--- pair local variables
eq $addRTxn(< PID : Partition |
gotTxns: (TXNS ;;
< PID . N : Txn | operations: OPS, readSet: nil, latest: empty,
localVars: empty, txnSQN: 0 >), AS >)
= < PID : Partition |
gotTxns: (TXNS ;;
< PID . N : Txn | operations: OPS, readSet: nil, latest: empty,
localVars: lvars(OPS), txnSQN: 0 >), AS > .
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where lvars generates the local variables by projecting the associated local variable from each key-local
variable pair. We do not show the cases of addWTxn and addRWTxn.
When there are no more transactions to generate, $init returns the generated objects:
eq $init(0, 0, 0, 0, PS’, noKeyVar, KVARS’, ROPS, WOPS, RWOPS, KAD, C) = C .
7.3. Statistical Model Checking Results
We performed our PVeStA experiments with different configurations, with 200 transactions, 2/4 operations
per read-only/-write transaction, up to 150 data items and up to 50 partitions, with lognormal message
delay distributions, and with uniform and Zipfian data item access distributions. Regarding lognormal’s
parameters, local delays use µ = 0 and σ = 1, while remote delays use µ = 3 and σ = 2.
The plots in Fig. 2 show the throughput as a function of the percentage of read-only transactions, and
number of keys (data items), sometimes with both uniform and Zipfian distributions. The plots show that
ROLA outperforms Jessy, which itself outperforms Walter, for all parameter combinations. As the number of
keys increases, the throughput of all three protocols increase. In particular, with 100 and more keys, ROLA
with uniform distribution has significant incremental throughput. We also learn from the plots that more
reads give higher throughput, since read-only transactions in all three protocols can commit locally without
certification. We only plot the results under uniform key access distribution for the top plot; these results
are consistent with the results using Zipfian distributions.
The plots in Fig. 3 show the average transaction latency as a function of the same parameters as the
plots for throughput. Again, we see that ROLA outperforms Jessy and Walter in all settings. In particular,
this difference between ROLA/Jessy and Walter is quite large for write-heavy workloads; the reason is that
Walter incurs more and more overhead for providing causality, which requires background propagation to
advance the vector timestamp. The latency tends to converge under read-heavy workload (because reads in
all three protocols can commit locally without certification), but ROLA still has noticeable lower latency
than the other two protocols.
The plots in Fig. 4 present the transaction commit rate as a function of the same parameters as the above.
The plots show that Walter has overall higher commit rate than ROLA, which itself has higher commit rate
than Jessy, because Walter trades latency for more committed transactions. As the number of keys increases,
the commit rate of all three protocols increase. In particular, with 100 or more keys, ROLA has significantly
higher commit rate than Jessy. We also learn from the plots that more reads give higher commit rate, as
read-only transactions in all three protocols can commit directly. We only plot the results under uniform
key access distribution for some parameter combinations, which are consistent with the results using Zipfian
distributions.
Our Maude specifications of ROLA, Walter, and Jessy have approximately 850, 1200 and 900 LOC,
respectively, all excluding approximate 300 shared LOC related to the scheduler and sampler, and 350
shared LOC related to the initial-states generator. Our Maude specifications of ROLA, Walter and Jessy
have 15, 27, and 16 rewrite rules, respectively. Computing the probabilities took a day (worst case) on 20
servers, each with a 64-bit Intel Quad Core Xeon E5530 CPU with 12 GB memory. Each point in the plots
represents the average of three statistical model checking results.
8. Related Work
Maude and PVeStA have been used to model and analyze the correctness and performance of a number
of distributed data stores: the Cassandra key-value store [25, 19, 20], different versions of RAMP [22, 21],
Walter [24], P-Store [30], and Google’s Megastore [14, 15]. In contrast to these papers, our paper uses formal
methods to develop and validate an entirely new design, ROLA, for a new consistency model.
We are not aware of other work on formal model-based performance analysis of globally-distributed trans-
actional databases. This might be because the most popular formal tools supporting probabilistic/statistical
model checking are based on automata (e.g., Uppaal SMC [2] and Prism [1]), and it seems hard to model
state-of-the-art distributed transactional systems using automata. Maude provides the expressiveness and
modeling convenience that makes it possible to model such complex systems with reasonable effort.
Concerning formal methods for distributed data stores, engineers at Amazon have used TLA+ and
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Figure 2. Throughput comparison under different workload conditions.
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Figure 3. Average latency comparison across varying workload conditions.
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Figure 4. Transaction commit rate comparison across varying workload conditions.
its model checker TLC to model and analyze the correctness of key parts of Amazon’s celebrated cloud
computing infrastructure [29]. In contrast to our work, they only use formal methods for correctness analysis;
indeed, one of their complaints is that they cannot use their formal method for performance estimation. The
designers of the TAPIR transaction protocol for distributed storage systems have also specified and model
checked correctness (but not performance) properties of their design using TLA+ [37].
In contrast to our work, whose aim is to develop and analyze high-level formal models to quickly explore
different design choices and finding bugs early, other approaches [18, 35] use distributed model checkers to
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analyze the implementation of cloud storage systems. Verifying both protocols and code is the goal of the
IronFleet framework at Microsoft Research [16]. Their verification methodology includes a wide range of
methods and tools, and requires (in contrast to our method) “considerable assistance from the developer.”
9. Conclusions
We have presented the formal design and analysis of ROLA, a distributed transaction protocol that supports
a new consistency model not present in the survey by Cerone et al. [11]. Using formal modeling and both
standard and statistical model checking analyses we have: (i) validated ROLA’s RA and PLU consistency
requirements; and (ii) analyzed its performance requirements, showing that ROLA outperforms Walter and
Jessy in all performance measures.
This work has shown, to the best of our knowledge for the first time, that the design and validation
of a new distributed transaction protocol can be achieved relatively quickly before its implementation by
the use of formal methods. This of course does not exclude the additional information and improvements
that will be gained by implementing ROLA; but it substantially reduces the effort required in reaching a
mature design. Our next planned step is to implement ROLA, evaluate it experimentally, and compare the
experimental results with the formal analysis ones. In previous work on existing systems such as Cassandra
[17], RAMP [7], and Walter [34], the performance estimates obtained by formal analysis and those obtained
by experimenting with the real system were basically in agreement with each other [19, 21, 24]. This confirmed
the useful predictive power of the formal analyses. Our future research will investigate the existence of a
similar agreement for ROLA.
This work is part of a long-term research effort in which we have been using Maude to both meet the
challenges and exploit the opportunities of modular design and analysis for cloud-based transaction systems
(see [10, 28] for surveys). As part of this effort, we have formally specified in Maude and analyzed both
the consistency and the performance properties of the following systems: Apache Cassandra [17], Google’s
Megastore [9] and its Megastore-CGC extension [15], RAMP [8], P-Store [31] Walter [34], and (in this paper
and [23]) ROLA and its comparison with both Walter [34] and Jessy [6]. From the analysis of all these
systems, which span different points in the consistency vs. performance spectrum for distributed transaction
systems, a better, more modular understanding of the different algorithms that need to be combined to
achieve the different designs and their relationships has been gained. An important next step in the near
future is to develop a library of formally specified components and show how system designs such as those
for ROLA, Walter, Jessy, the other systems described above, and other future systems can be obtained as
modular compositions out of such a library of components. We should then use such components to extend
ROLA to deal with data replication.
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Figure 5. The RAMP-Fast algorithm as described in [7].
A. The RAMP-Fast Algorithm as Given in [7]
Figure 5 shows the RAMP-Fast algorithm as it is described in [7].
